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Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 15, 86 P.3d 1042 (2004).1 
 




 Appeal of an order modifying custody of parties’ children.  
 
Disposition/Outcome   
 
 Affirmed.  A party seeking to modify custody of children may introduce evidence 
of domestic violence if either of the parties or the district court was unaware of the 
existence or extent of the conduct when the prior custody order was entered.     
 
Factual and Procedural History 
   
 Mr. Simmons and Ms. Castle, husband and wife respectively, were married on 
June 22, 1979, and divorced August 13, 1998.  While married, they had six children.  The 
divorce decree awarded “full legal and physical” custody to Ms. Castle, while giving Mr. 
Simmons “reasonable” visitation.   
 After the parties were divorced, Mr. Simmon’s two oldest sons told him that Ms. 
Castle had physically abused them as well as their younger siblings before and after the 
original decree and award of custody.  On that basis, Mr. Simmon’s attempted to modify 
the custody arrangement.  The district court granted Mr. Simmon’s ex parte application 
for temporary custody, and the parties stipulated to share custody of the three remaining 
children pending a final ruling on the motion to modify.            
 At the hearing, the children were represented by independent counsel.  More than 
twenty witnesses offered conflicting testimony.  The district court found that clear and 
convincing evidence existed that supported the claims of physical abuse of the children 
by Ms. Castle.  The court found that a change in custody was warranted, based NRS 
125C.230(1), which creates a presumption that when a parent engages in domestic 
violence, that parent’s sole or joint custody of the children is not in the children’s best 
interest.  The district court proceeded to order that custody of the minor children be 
changed in favor of Mr. Simmons.  
 Ms. Castle appealed, primarily basing her appeal on the district court’s abuse of 
discretion in (1) considering pre-decree misconduct (2) finding that the instances of abuse 
were shown by clear and convincing evidence (3) failing to find that any showing of 
abuse was rebutted (4) finding that Mr. Simmons satisfactorily established a change in 
circumstances between the entry of the divorce decree in 1998 and the ex parte 
application to change custody in 2001 and (5) concluding that modification was in the 
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Discussion  
 
 The supreme court affirmed, holding that clear and convincing evidence did exist 
for the district court to conclude that acts of domestic violence had been committed 
against the children.  The district court relied on the testimony of three of the children 
and Mr. Simmons to make its ruling.  This testimony included accounts of domestic 
violence committed by Ms. Castle.  While Ms. Castle raised numerous claims against the 
credibility of Mr. Simmons witnesses, the supreme court declined to reassess the 
witnesses’ testimony because that was the function of the district court. 
 Ms. Castle raised a claim that the district court erred in determining that Mr. 
Simmons satisfied the test for custody modification established in Murphy v. Murphy.2  
In rejecting this argument, the court established that res judicata should not be used to 
preclude parties from introducing evidence of domestic violence that was not known to 
the party at the time the court rendered a decision on child custody.  Further, the court 
overruled two cases to the extent that they differ with Castle with respect to allowing 
introduction of evidence of previously unknown abuse.3       
 Ms. Castle also raised three other issues that the court quickly dismissed.  First, 
the court rejected her argument that the district court did not take into account other 
issues concerning the children’s best interest.  The supreme court rejected this argument 
because the district court took into account Mr. Simmons employment prospects, the 
financial status of Mr. Simmon’s current spouse and the relative residential situations of 
both of the parties when it determined the custody modification.  Second, the court 
rejected Ms. Castle’s argument that the child advocate appointed by the court was not 
qualified.4  Finally, the court rejected the argument that Mr. Simmons violated a local 
district court rule by setting the motion to modify before the wrong judge.5  The court 
rejected this argument because Ms. Castle never attempted to disqualify the judge and 
because no substantial violation of the rules occurred.      
 
Conclusion       
  
 The supreme court will not reverse a child custody ruling unless there is a clear 
abuse of discretion.  In child custody cases, Castle provides more protection against 
children in cases of domestic violence because the supreme court will give the district 
court deference with respect to finding of fact.  Moreover, the abolishment of res judicata 
in cases where evidence of domestic violence is discovered after the custody 
determination is made will further protect the interests of children.    
                                                 
2 447 P.2d 664 (Nev. 1968).  The Murphy test is a two-pronged test for custody changes that applies only 
when one parent has primary physical custody allowing change in physical custody only when (1) the 
circumstances of the parents have been materially altered; and (2) the child’s welfare would be 
substantially enhanced by the change.  Id. at 665.         
3 See Hopper v. Hopper, 946 P.2d 171 (Nev. 1997); McMonigle v. McMonigle, 887 P.2d 742 (Nev. 1994). 
4 While the child advocate did not meet the technical definition of a child advocate under NRS 433.209, the 
supreme court held that his qualifications were in substantial compliance with the statute. 
5 See 4JDCR 2(5). 
